Thursday, July 30, 2009

Ed Ames - The Great War



Edwin Alfred Ames
79th "Manitoba Rangers" Battalion
107th “Timber Wolf” Battalion

When King George V of Great Britain declared war in August 1914, Canada, together with the rest of the British Empire was at war. The call to arms was enthusiastically supported by British Canadians like Glenlyon Campbell, first white settler of Gilbert Plains, Manitoba. Glen Campbell was a prairie-bred scout to Major-General Middleton at the decisive Battle of Batoche, that led to the surrender of Louis Riel on May 15, 1885. By virtue of his promotion to the rank of captain in the Battle of Batoche, and his persuasive nature, Campbell was assigned to the Brandon-based 79th (Manitoba Rangers) Infantry Battalion of the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) based in Brandon, and authorised to raise his own company.

With no links to the existing militia, recruiting depended entirely on Campbell’s reputation, which was formidable. Besides being a “prairie-bred scout” of some renown, Campbell was the son of the chief factor for the Hudson’s Bay Company. He had been educated in Glasgow and Edinburgh, had become a rancher, and had served as a Conservative Member of Parliament for the riding of Gilbert Plains before being rewarded with the position of Inspector General of Indian Affairs in western Canada. With the motto “Follow me,” and the regimental march, “The Campbells are coming,” he attracted 1,741 volunteers, many of them natives. He rejected 600 men and achieved full strength within three months. Edwin Alfred Ames was among this hard-riding battalion of natives and cowpunchers that on 4 Nov. 1915 became the 107th Pioneer Battalion; reported to be “NCOs and men…, of good physique and above average intelligence, though few hold certificates.”

The Battalion was a curious mix of the old and the new. While its Pipe and Drum Band reflected its Imperial linkages and Campbell's heritage, its Wolf cap badge seems to reflect the frontier and an ancient native Canadian influence.


Like Glen Campbell, Ed Ames fit the western pioneer stereotype of a “towering figure, bronzed swarthy face, large brown eyes, capped off with a cowboy hat.” When he enlisted on August 3, 1915, like most of the first volunteers, motivated by the virtues of patriotism and loyalty, as well as a thirst for adventure in the struggle against aggressive Germany tyranny, he was probably worried that the war would be over by Christmas.

In June 1916 the 107th moved to Camp Hughes just west of Carberry, Manitoba for serious training in extensive trench systems, grenade and rifle ranges. On September 19, 1916, the 107th sailed from Halifax on the Olympic, with the 5,000 members of the Canadian Expeditionary Force. Upon arrival in England, the 107th, initially an infantry unit, was reconfigured as a Pioneer Battalion, which were infantry soldiers trained to conduct basic combat engineering tasks (usually associated with the preparing of defenses or the breaching of obstacles) in the very front line. However, Pioneers were neither support troops, like the Entrenching Battalions or Railway Companies (unarmed units assigned specific tasks in the rear areas) nor pure engineers like the Engineering Field Companies (professional engineers capable of sophisticated design and construction in the battle area) but fighting troops. They were armed, trained and employed in combat roles, when not assigned engineering tasks.

Unlike other battalions of the CEF which were routinely broken up to reinforce existing units, the 107th was spared significant depletion. Campbell insisted that as a unit, his men were well suited to combat engineering tasks, and his superiors felt that the natives would work better under their own officers. So, together, in February 1917, the 107th Pioneer Battalion moved to France, the last complete unit from western Canada to join the Canadian Corps.

Upon arrival they came under the command of Major-General Arthur Currie, as part of the 1st Canadian Divisional Engineers, and were soon engaged in an endless series of exhausting and often dangerous tasks behind the line at Vimy Ridge. In April, 1917, as part of the Canadian Corp, operating as a unit for the first time, they successfully captured Vimy Ridge from the Germans, in the first major victory for the Allies to that point in the war. With the promotion of Lieut.-General Sir Julian Byng to the command of the British 3rd Army in June 1917, and his replacement by Arthur Currie meant that for the first time in history, a Canadian was in command of all Canadian troops.

The 107th held a section of the front line from late June until mid-July 1917, running the same trench warfare housekeeping and fighting routines as any other infantry unit, while at the same time providing large semi-skilled work parties to conduct engineering battlefield preparation works.

On July 7th, 1917 Currie was ordered to take the town of Lens in northern France. The town was strategic; the Germans needed it for its rail access, the British wanted it for its coal. Additionally, the British wanted to use the attack as a feint, committing German troops to Lens while the British and French attacked in the Somme area.

According to the British, this action was to have involved a frontal assault on the town of Lens, but this was not allowed to happen. Currie rejected the First Army plan to attack the town, believing that a direct assault into the fortified ruins of an urban area would favour the defender and likely cost the Canadians horrific casualties. General Currie had been a very successful Divisional Commander who had
started to solidify what was to be known as the Canadian approach to war - the expending of firepower and material, not human lives, to win objectives. Currie rejected the First Army plan to attack the town.

Instead, he selected the high ground around the shattered town of Lens as his objective. The occupation of the elevated positions, overlooking the city, with another "Vimy" type assault would threaten the entire German defensive position in the sector. The German reaction would likely be to counter attack consuming valuable men and material, thus advancing the First Army's strategic mission. This decision reflects the sophistication of Currie's leadership and expertise in both the interpretation of strategy and in the science of modern warfare. Currie was a superb tactician, one of the best military minds of all time, but the British Army structure did not appreciate Generals changing orders. The issue was raised to Field Marshall Sir Douglas Haig, commander of the British forces. Haig approved the attack, but predicted that it would fail.

Hill 70 was a perfect defensive position. It was a maze of deep trenches and dugouts and included deep mines that had been dug in peacetime and could protect the defenders. Coiled barbed wire, up to 5 feet in height in front of the trenches would make a frontal attack difficult. Machine guns were deeply entrenched in the slopes, inside of pill-boxes reinforced in concrete. Additionally, in July 1917 the Germans introduced flame-throwers and mustard gas, which blistered any portion of exposed skin. Overall, it wasn’t an enviable target to be given.

Preparations for the attack were extensive. As they had done at Vimy, an area behind the lines was laid out to represent Hill 70, and units practiced the attack until every section knew exactly what they had to do. Additionally, the hill and the surrounding area were subjected to ongoing bombardment and gas attacks. Currie also devised an innovative battle plan which depended largely on the new technologies and skills of the Canadian Corps and built on the experience gained at Vimy and elsewhere. He planned to quickly occupy the high ground in a whirlwind attack, establish defensive positions (studded with platoon-sized machine-gun equipped strong points) and destroy, with a combined arms curtain of fire, the German forces, who he knew would counterattack. Hill 70 was to be "a killing by artillery" and would be the first time radio communications with ground spotters was employed as well as aerial observers to provide deep observation and targeting for the Division and Corps guns.

On the evening of 14 August the attack commenced with the bombardment of the hill by the Canadian artillery, damaging the trenches and blowing holes in the defensive wire. At 4:25 AM, dawn of August 15, the Canadians went over the top, the 2nd Division in the center, the 1st Division on the left. The 107th Pioneer Battalion was in direct support of the 3rd Infantry Brigade of 1st Division.

The forward positions of the 26th and 165th Regiments of the German 7th Division were overwhelmed by the dynamic, violent and well practiced battle skills of the Canadian infantry. Following the assault the troops of the 107th we charged with digging “communication trenches” across the 300 to 500 yards of deadly no-man's-land, while under fire. Linking the Canadian front lines with the newly captured enemy front lines via these zig-zag constructions was vital to the safe movement forward of the men and material needed to secure the captured ground and implement Currie's plan to inflict a bloody repulse of the inevitable counterattacks. To appreciate their mission, it is useful to remember that pioneers were really infantry soldiers - trained, armed and equipped for close combat. Each pioneer carried a personal load of ammunition, food, water and weapons often totaling 60 to 80 pounds. As a pioneer company, each group's standard load would have also included: 27 spools of barbed wire; 200 sand bags; 100 shovels/picks/axes; large wire cutters; and an ammunition stock of 6,000 rounds (mostly for their Lewis Guns), as well as 100 grenades.

The 107th went forward with orders to support the "straight" infantry with engineering tasks but could have been re-tasked to join in an assault and were expected to defend themselves on the active battlefield. No other Canadian soldiers were expected to carry such physical burdens or to have such operational flexibility. The battalions of the 3rd Brigade reached their objectives by about 0600 hours and were ready to destroy (with the help of massed artillery fire) the expected counterattacks. The three companies of the 107th spent that entire first day dangerously exposed in no-man's-land, working on the communication trenches. The cost was high. The three companies lost 21 dead and 130 badly wounded of the 600 men engaged.

The 107th continued its trenching tasks throughout the first night. "D" Company actually dug all the way from the start line to the Blue Line, a distance of about 600 yards. Late on the night of the 16th the troops of the 107th also carried forward construction stores to the most advanced positions. While the infantry continued to defend their new positions on the 17th, the 107th continued its tasks under fire and a new threat, blister gas.

Finally, on the night of 17/18 August, the 107th was ordered to the rear to rest. The other units of the 3rd Brigade had already been replaced during the previous night. It was at this point that an element of the 107th took on another task, not one of combat but rather one of rescue. One Company of the 107th volunteered to stay behind and search for wounded in the harder hit sector to the south, particularly in the area of the 10th Battalion. Campbell gave his permission and during the night many wounded were rescued and about 30 dead buried. Unfortunately, the Germans detected the activity and launched a gas attack that poisoned 88 members of the 107th Battalion.

Edwin Ames may have been among the 88. Family records report him present at the Battles of Vimy Ridge and Hill 70, but absent from the next at the Battle of Passchendaele, where Lieutenant-Colonel Archibald Glenlyon Campbell was killed on October 20th, 1917. He son, George Ames reported that, after being gassed badly in 1917. Following a lengthy stay in a hospital in England, Ed was discharged from the army on April 14th, 1919.

The battle for Hill 70 continued, with the Germans counterattacking 21 times, the last at dawn on August 18th. The Canadians repulsed them all. Lens was not taken; however holding the high ground of Hill 70 seriously impacted the German position.

The attack on Hill 70 resulted in Allied casualties totaling 1,505 men killed, 3,810 wounded, 487 wounded by gas and 41 prisoners to the Germans; the bulk of the causalities were on the first day of the attack. The Germans who had committed 5 divisions in an attempt to hold Hill 70, suffered much greater losses with approximately 20,000 causalities and 970 Germans taken prisoner.

Douglas Haig was wrong in his prediction; Currie had proven himself a superior tactician to the British command. On Hill 70, Canadian troops earned five Victoria Crosses during this 4 day period. Their reputation and their German nickname "Sturmtruppen" were cemented in this action. Thereafter, to the Germans, the Canadians were known as "storm trooper"; the troops most feared by the Germans during the First World War, and the German army always prepared for the worst when an attack was spearheaded by the Canadian army.